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






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(S NF) Aside from the respective liaison staffs, NSA and GCHQ exchange large number of integrees NSA/CSS personne at GCHQ; some GCHQ integrees at NSA). Most integrees work NSA/CSS personnel hard at technical skills and contribute greatly to a mutual interchange of ideals and techniques that benefit both side greatly. More so in recent years, some operational and staff elements in GCHQ have begun to use integrees as their representatives, and some integrees have assumed liaison-like functions. Making matters worse has been a recent trend to send integrees to function as special assistants, sometimes to alpha plus-one components working sensitive missions. While they are no doubt of great help to NSA managers, they also serve as lobbyists for GCHQ seniors in policy matters. Recently GCHQ/K1 lobbied hard to place an integree in the G2/SA position. G2 rightly rejected this as it would give GCHQ insight into certain sensitive operations we do not share. In another instance a strategically placed GCHQ integree drafted an MOA that committed assistance from NSA to GCHQ -- without addressing the correctness of this assistance, the propriety of this situation is disturbing.

-(S NF) Whether comms links or exchange of integrees, the mode of interfacing with GCHQ evolves based on a myriad of decisions at various levels within NSA. Do we need to have an overall policy to ensure that these agreements are consistent with our plans for the future? For instance, should we determine a modus vivendi for exchange of integrees? Should the type of work be limited by charter? Should there be a common NSA position on the number and kind of electronic interfaces between NSA and GCHQ? Should the number be driven by NSA design or by GCHQ needs?

⁽b) (1) (b) (3) -18 USC 798

⁽b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

⁽b) (3) -P.L. 86-36



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